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The Effects of Lottery Prizes on Winners and their Neighbors: 
Evidence from the Dutch Postcode Lottery
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Each week, the Dutch Postcode Lottery (PCL) randomly selects a postal code, and 
distributes cash and a new BMW to lottery participants in that code. We study the effects of 
these shocks on lottery winners and their neighbors. Consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis, 
the effects on winners’ consumption are largely confined to cars and other durables. 
Consistent with the theory of in-kind transfers, the vast majority of BMW winners liquidate 
their BMWs. We do, however, detect substantial social effects of lottery winnings: PCL 
nonparticipants who live next door to winners have significantly higher levels of car 
consumption than other nonparticipants. 
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  Economic theory offers a rich set of predictions concerning the effects of income 
shocks on household behavior.  For example, the permanent income hypothesis argues 
that households should save the lion’s share of any income shocks they receive.  The 
classical theory of in-kind transfers predicts that households who receive such shocks in 
kind (for example as vouchers for food, school, or housing) should in most cases treat 
them as cash.  According to the Easterlin hypothesis, positive shocks to one’s neighbors’ 
incomes should reduce one’s happiness, while Veblen effects suggest that shocks to 
neighbors’ incomes could also affect one’s own consumption. 
  To date, empirical testing of all the above predictions has been hampered by the 
lack of credibly exogenous variation in either a household’s own income, or in the 
income of its neighbors. Recently, however, progress regarding own income effects has 
been made by using a sample of lottery winners (Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote 2001) and 
by exploiting the random timing of income tax rebates (Agarwal, Liu and Souleles 2007). 
Social effects of income shocks have recently been studied by Luttmer (2005), and 
Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), though only the latter paper has access to randomized 
variation in neighbors’ incomes.  We are aware of no natural-experimental evidence 
concerning the effects of in-kind transfers on consumption decisions. 
  In this paper we study all the above hypotheses using data from the Dutch 
Postcode Lottery (PCL).  Each week, this lottery allocates a prize to participants in a 
randomly chosen postcode (containing 19 households on average).  More than one 
quarter of the Dutch population participates in the lottery. A participant wins €12,500 per 
ticket.  In addition, one participating household in the winning postcode receives a new 
BMW.  From an experimental design perspective, the lottery provides PCL participants 
in the winning code with an unexpected temporary income shock equal on average to 
about eight months of income, while leaving all other households’ incomes unchanged.
1 
Our survey data includes information on consumption and happiness for four groups of 
                                                 
1 These income shocks are much larger than those studied by Agarwal et al. (2007); other differences 
between our study and theirs are that we have income information, we have considerable detail on the types 
of household expenditures, and the income shocks in our experiment were almost surely unexpected by 
their recipients.  Compared to Imbens et al. (2001), we have a larger sample, more detail on types of 
consumption expenditures, smaller income shocks, and the income shocks we study are temporary.   2
households: lottery participants and nonparticipants in winning and in nearby non-
winning postcodes.  Given the inherent randomness in the prize draws and absent 
externalities between winning and non-winning postcodes, participants in non-winning 
postcodes constitute a valid counterfactual for participants in winning postcodes. This 
allows us to test for the effects of unexpected, temporary income shocks (both cash and in 
kind) on winning households’ consumption and happiness under quite general conditions.  
  Similarly, under the above conditions nonparticipants in non-winning postcodes 
constitute a valid counterfactual for nonparticipants in winning postcodes. This allows for 
a clean test for social effects of income shocks on non-participating households’ 
consumption and happiness.  A noteworthy feature of our analysis of social effects is its 
partial-population design, in which a subset of the members of a fixed peer group 
receives an exogenous shock.  Unlike what Moffitt (2001) calls group-changing 
interventions (where subjects are moved to a new peer group), partial population designs 
are not contaminated by the causal effects of mobility itself. Partial population designs 
have recently been used to estimate the extent of information dissemination and learning 
among neighbors and friends (Duflo and Saez 2003; Duflo, Kremer and Robinson 2004; 
Miguel and Kremer 2004) and peer effects in school participation (Bobonis and Finan 
2009; Lalive and Cattaneo 2009). 
  One notion of an ideal partial population design starts with a sample of social 
groups (say villages) assumed to be isolated from one another (so there are no cross-
village externalities). Next, a number of villages are randomly assigned to be ‘treatment 
villages’.  Finally, a random subset of the households in these treatment villages is 
treated.  No households in the nontreatment villages are treated.  In this design, between-
village comparisons identify (a) the effect of village-level treatment on the mean outcome 
of the entire village, inclusive of all social interaction effects; (b) the effect of village-
level treatment on treated households; and (c) the effect of village treatment on non-
treated households.  The latter provides a clean test for the existence of social effects 
since it should be zero if there are no externalities within villages.      
Most, if not all, actual studies of social effects differ from the above ideal in some 
way.  For example, in a well-known study of health-related interventions, Miguel and 
Kremer (2004) randomize treatment eligibility across groups (in their case Kenyan 
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schools), but cannot experimentally manipulate individuals’ treatment takeup decisions 
within schools.  Thus, while they can identify the effects of school-level treatment on the 
entire school (inclusive of social interactions between treated and nontreated children), 
they are forced to rely on nonexperimental methods to identify within-school social 
effects.  
Like Miguel and Kremer, our paper differs from the ideal design in that, rather 
than being randomly assigned to treatment within social groups, individuals in our data 
choose whether to take up treatment or not.  A crucial distinction, however, is that in our 
case, this takeup decision (participation in the Postcode Lottery) is made before the 
random selection of groups (in our case postcodes) to be treated is made.  This has two 
consequences:  First, in contrast to designs like Miguel and Kremer’s, we observe which 
individuals in the nontreated postcodes would have been treated had those postcodes been 
randomly selected for treatment.  Thus we can estimate separate effects of postcode 
treatment for PCL participants and nonparticipants.
2  Second, although lottery 
nonparticipants are not a random sample of the population, the difference in their 
outcomes between treated versus nontreated postcodes provides a valid test for the 
existence of within-postcode social effects on that ex ante-identifiable group.  Thus, in 
contrast to Miguel and Kremer, we are able to test for within-group social effects directly 
from our experimental design.
3     
  Most related to our study is Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009), which is to our 
knowledge the first study of social effects in household consumption using a partial-
population design. Using data from a program that targets poor households in small rural 
communities in Mexico with bimonthly conditional grants to improve education, health 
                                                 
2 In designs where agents self-select into treatment after eligibility is randomized, the treatment effect on-
the-treated (TOT) is sometimes estimated by the difference in outcome between treatment and control 
groups, divided by the fraction of members f in the treatment group who take up the treatment.  This 
procedure suffers from the potential defect that the treatment effects are derived by comparing a subsample 
of observations from the experimental group to the entire sample of control observations. See Burtless and 
Greenberg (1983) for an early discussion. 
3 Our design does not, however, yield an experimental estimate of the effects of neighbors’ lottery winnings 
on PCL participants.  Heterogenous treatment effects between the treated and nontreated may however be 
less of a concern in our context than in cases where individual selection into treatment occurs after group 
randomization, since in the latter case we would expect persons who expect to benefit most from the 
treatment to select into it (and those who benefit most from spillovers, e.g. from others’ immunizations, to 
select out of it).  In our case, it is hard to think of a reason why neighbors’ income shocks would have a 
larger effect on the consumption of PCL nonparticipants than on the consumption of participants.   
     4
and nutrition, they find strong evidence of positive program externalities on non-eligible 
households through informal insurance and credit markets.  Treatments are randomized 
over villages. Each village contains eligible (poor) and non-eligible (non-poor) 
households, and eligibility is a nonrandom event based on a household’s poverty status. 
Estimates of the average treatment effects (ATEs) and social or indirect treatment effects 
(ITEs) are obtained by comparing mean observed outcomes for the poor (nonpoor) in 
treatment and control villages.
4  Thus, their design is analogous to ours, with pre-
program income playing the same role as PCL participation in our study.  Our study, 
however, relates to an urbanized, developed economy with broad participation in formal 
capital and insurance markets, where we might expect the permanent income hypothesis 
to be more applicable.    
                                                
  In addition to simple comparisons between winning and non-winning codes, we 
present estimates from a regression-based approach that accounts for differences in 
treatment intensity (i.e. amounts won, both in the household and in its vicinity), and 
explore the sensitivity of our results to a wide range of alternative specifications of a 
household’s social comparison group, such as its two and four nearest neighbors and the 
set of other households within 25 meters. The regression framework also allows us --at 
the cost of some additional assumptions--  to identify some additional quantities (such as 
pure ‘own’ effects of lottery income shocks on participants) in addition to the above ATE 
and ITE.   
Our estimated effects of lottery winnings on winners are consistent with theories 
of in-kind transfers (e.g. Moffitt 1984, 1989): we find that the vast majority of BMW 
winners do not own a BMW six months after the lottery.  Consistent with a simple life-
cycle model of consumption, we do not detect any effect of winning the postcode lottery 
on most components of winning households’ expenditures, including food at home, 
transportation, and total monthly outlays. However, we do find effects on car 
expenditures and other durable expenditures of winners.  These effects are consistent 
with a version of the life-cycle consumption model in which households adjust the timing 
of durables purchases to smooth consumption (Browning and Crossley 2009) or a model 
 
4 As in Miguel-Kremer, individuals in Angelucci and De Giorgi’s design who are eligible based on their 
income could in priniciple fail to sign up for the program.  This turns out to be rare in practice, however.   
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with self-imposed borrowing constraints (Shefrin and Thaler 1988). 
  Turning to social effects, we detect statistically significant effects of lottery prizes 
on the car consumption of neighbors of winners.  For example, having an immediate 
neighbor win the PCL raises the probability that a household will buy a car in the next six 
months by close to 7 percentage points and reduces the mean age of its main car at the 
survey date by half a year (about a 7 percent decline). Relative to the modest effects of 
the lottery prizes on the consumption choices of winning households, these effects on 
neighbors are large. 
 
2.  The Dutch Postcode Lottery and the Street Prize  
 The  Nationale Postcode Loterij (PCL) is the second largest national lottery in the 
Netherlands, with a revenue market share of 26.6 percent in 2005. 
 
Contrary to the 
Staatsloterij (State Lottery), the largest Dutch lottery (market share 42.6 percent in 2005), 
the PCL is a charity lottery: A condition for its license is that at least 50 percent of 
revenues must be donated to approved charities. Since its inception in 1990 the PCL has 
grown steadily.  In 2005 almost 30 percent of the Dutch population participated in the 
PCL, with an estimated annual expenditure per participant of €175.
 
 
  In the PCL the lottery ticket number is the participant’s 6-digit postcode. Thus, 
conditional on purchasing a ticket, a household’s probability of winning the PCL in any 
given week is approximately equal to one divided by the number of postcodes in the 
Netherlands (about 430,000). The popularity of the PCL is sometimes attributed to its 
potential to induce regret among nonparticipants (Zeelenberg and Pieters 2004); 
nonparticipants living in a winning code know for sure that they would have won had 
they purchased a ticket. Moreover, the weekly award of prizes is widely publicized in the 
media, including – in most cases – a broadcast on national television around 10 pm on 




  During our sample period, participants paid from €6.25 to €6.75 per ticket (the 
price increased during the sample period), which is debited monthly from their bank 
account. There are no restrictions on the number of lottery tickets that can be purchased 
per participant. The PCL awards several prizes, ranging from very large ones (around €10 
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million, once or twice a year) to very small ones.
5  In this paper we focus on one 
particular prize, the weekly Street Prize.  If a postcode is selected as the winning code, a 
prize of €12,500 per lottery ticket is awarded to participants living in that postcode.  Net 
of the 25% lottery tax, which is applied to all lottery prizes larger than €454, this amounts 
to €9,375 during our sample period. Because randomization is over postcodes instead of 
tickets, the number of tickets owned does not affect the probability of winning, only the 
amount won conditional on winning. 
  In addition to the monetary prizes, one of the Street-Prize winners wins a new 
BMW. The BMW winner is chosen by randomly selecting one of the winning lottery 
tickets. In contrast to the monetary prizes, the probability of winning the BMW does 
increase with the number of tickets held. BMW winners have the option of receiving the 
cash value of the BMW in lieu of the car itself.  This however involves a substantial tax 
penalty, since the PCL authority pays the 25% lottery tax for winners who accept the 
BMW in kind, but not for those who choose the cash equivalent (about €25,000).  Of 
course, winners also have the option of selling their new BMW, and incurring any 
associated transactions costs.
6   
 
3. Econometric Framework 
  As mentioned, our data is a sample of households living in winning postcodes, as 
well as in neighboring, nonwinning postcodes.  Throughout our discussion, we refer to a 
winning postcode plus all the non-winning nearby codes associated with it as a 
“codegroup”. In addition to being part of a codegroup CG(i) and a postcode PC(i) (with 
PC(i)  CG(i)), we define for each household i its assumed social comparison group N(i). 
A natural candidate is the other households in the postcode:  N(i) = PC(i)\{i}, but our 
empirical analysis also considers alternative definitions of N(i), like a household’s two 
(four) immediate neighbors and the set of other households within 25 meters distance. 
The treatment consists of a partial-population experiment with lottery prizes being 
awarded to lottery participants (Pi = 1) in a randomly chosen set of winning postcodes 
(Wi = 1). 
                                                 
5 Eligibility for the large ‘jackpot’ prize requires households to pay an extra monthly fee (which increased 
from €1.25 to €1.50 during our sample period).  
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Effects on Winners 
Define C1i as the consumption of household i in a winning postcode (Wi =1) if a 
prize would fall in its postcode; similarly, C0i is the consumption of a household if no 
prize would fall in its postcode.  Observed consumption equals Ci = C0i + Wi(C1i – C0i). 
We consider the effect of living in a winning postcode on the consumption of lottery 
participants. The average treatment effect on participants is given by:  
(1)   ATE   = E[C1i | Wi =1, Pi =1]-E[C0i | Wi =1, Pi =1] 
The data do not reveal potential consumption in the absence of the treatment for 
participants in winning codes. We assume that the value of this expectation is the same as 
the potential consumption in the absence of prizes for participants in non-winning codes: 
Assumption 1:  E(C0i | Wi =1,Pi =1) =  E(C0i | Wi =0, Pi =1).  
Under Assumption 1, the difference  
(2)   E[Ci | Wi =1, Pi =1]-E[Ci | Wi =0, Pi =1]  
identifies the ATE. We note here that the ATE, or the effect of living in a winning code 
on PCL participants, includes (in addition to the ‘own’ effects of winning money) any 
social effects deriving from other winning households in the postcode; in this sense the 
ATE does not identify ‘pure’ own effects of lottery winnings (unless, of course, social 
effects are zero, which is the implicit assumption in essentially all other studies of own 
income shocks and consumption).  As noted, Section 7 isolates pure own effects by 
imposing some additional structure. 
 
Effects on Neighbors of Winners 
Similarly, the average indirect effect of the lottery prize on non-participating 
households is given by:  
(3)   ITE = E(C1i | Wi =1, Pi =0) - E(C0i | Wi =1, Pi =0) 
Under random assignment of prizes, the expected consumption in the absence of a prize-
win is equal for winning and non-winning postcodes, that is:  
Assumption 2:  E(C0i | Wi =1, Pi =0) =  E(C0i | Wi =0, Pi =0)  
Analogous to the case for participants, under Assumption 2, the difference  
                                                                                                                                                 
6 We have observed a small number of ads for BMWs won in the PCL on the Dutch equivalent of eBay. 
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4. Data  
From September 2003 until July 2006 we sent out written surveys to all addresses 
in PCL-winning postcodes, six months after the prize was won. Moreover, for each 
winning postcode, we selected one or more neighboring postcodes as a control group, and 
sent out the same written survey to those postcodes.
8  In all, we surveyed households in 
419 postcodes.  An average postcode contains 19 households; the smallest postcode 
surveyed contained 4 households and the largest 105.  Very few Dutch postcodes (8/419 
= 2.1% in our sample) contain more than 45 households.  The survey contains questions 
on household composition, demographic variables (age, gender, ethnicity, family 
relationships and marital status), education, labor supply, happiness, car ownership, large 
expenditures, income, and lottery participation. For some of the questions respondents 
provided information on both current behavior (i.e. six months after the prize) and, 
retrospectively, behavior a year earlier (i.e. six months before the prize).  
  At the beginning of the survey, households were invited to participate in 
“scientiﬁc research on expenditures and income of Dutch households”, without any 
reference to social interactions or the PCL.  Questions about lottery participation were 
asked after the consumption questions, near the end of the survey.  Households were 
offered €7.50 (€10.00 in a small number of cases) to complete the survey.  Respondents 
                                                 
7 Assumption 2 shows the two opposing objectives in selecting the non-winning postcodes. First, to control 
as well as possible for any unobserved household characteristics that vary smoothly over space, households 
in non-winning codes should not live too far away from households in winning postcodes. This maximizes 
the credibility of Assumption 1. On the other hand, nonparticipants in non-winning postcodes should on 
average live farther away from winners than do nonparticipants in winning postcodes to ensure that 
consumption by nonparticipants in non-winning codes is not affected by the prize draw. Importantly, it is 
likely that any indirect effects on nonparticipants in non-winning postcodes are of the same sign as for 
nonparticipants in winning postcodes. In that case, our estimated ITE can be interpreted as a lower bound 
for the true ITE. 
8 Specifically, for each winning postcode, we examined a map of the area, and first selected the 
neighboring code that was closest to the winning code.  We then added other adjacent postcodes up to the 
point where the number of non-winning addresses was at least twice the number of addresses in the 
winning code.  If fewer than this number of addresses were available in adjacent codes, we settled for less. 
In the rare circumstances where we had to choose between multiple neighboring postcodes at a similar 
distance from the winning postcode, those postcodes with a size (in terms of number of addresses) similar 
to the winning postcode were included first.  
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could choose among a number of charities to receive this fee, or could provide any bank 
account number (including their own) to which the token was to be credited. If 
households did not respond within two weeks, a reminder was sent to households whose 
phone number was not known.  Other non-respondents were called and asked to complete 
the questionnaire by telephone with the assistance of a survey agency employee. The 
response rate was 32.1 percent in winning postcodes, 33.0 percent in non-winning codes, 
and 32.7 percent overall.  This overall rate is close to the average response percentage of 
Statistics Netherlands for similar surveys.  Our ﬁnal sample contains 2011 observations, 
510 of which were completed by telephone. 
  Since our sampling frame is based on addresses six months after the lottery, our 
sample would be nonrepresentative if households’ propensity to move out of a postcode 
depends on whether that code (or household) won the PCL.  We examined this question 
directly using the Cadastre and Public Register Agency data on house sales, finding no 
significant difference in the number of home sales after the PCL prize draw between 
winning and non-winning addresses.  These results are reported on the paper’s website.  
  The street addresses of all respondents to our survey are known.  Identification of 
social effects is however facilitated if we know the location of all lottery winners in the 
winning codes surveyed, including those winners who did not respond to our survey.  The 
PCL administration provided us with the location (street addresses) of all winners, plus 
information on winnings for every winning postcode in our survey.  From these 
addresses, and from geographical (x, y) coordinates obtained from municipal land registry 
offices, we compute two alternative classes of social comparison groups for a typical 
household (in addition to the postcode itself). The first defines a household’s two 
immediate neighbors as those addresses in the same postcode with house numbers (or 
unit numbers in the case of multi-unit addresses) immediately below and above its own 
house number (houses in a postcode all share the same street name); its nearest four 
neighbors are defined analogously.  A second class of proximity measures uses the (x, y) 
coordinates (in meters) for all addresses in the postcodes in our sample, plus those of all 
the lottery winners as reported by the PCL administrators.  In this data, addresses within 
the same building have the same (x, y) coordinates.  Thus, within buildings, our 
‘neighbor’ variable based on the unit number might be a superior measure of proximity to 
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winners than that based on (x, y) coordinates.  One might argue that physical visibility or 
social distance is more relevant to peer effects than Euclidian distance.  Our choice of the 
latter is guided by data availability.  
  By definition, a postcode can only be a winning code if it contains at least one 
household that purchased a PCL ticket; non-winning codes do not have so satisfy this 
criterion to be in our sample. As a result, in our sample, the PCL participation rate in 
winning codes is significantly higher than in non-winning codes (0.32 versus 0.26; p = 
.003). This difference becomes smaller and statistically insignificant in a linear 
probability model that controls for codegroup fixed effects and respondent characteristics 
(see the paper’s website). To check whether this phenomenon affects our results, we 
redid the full analysis restricting the sample to postcodes that contain at least 16 
addresses (also on the paper’s website). In these postcodes, the probability that no one 
participates in the PCL is smaller than 1 percent.
9  Our main results remained unchanged.  
  Tables 1 and 2 report descriptive statistics for the households in our survey.  In 
addition to providing a statistical portrait of our respondents before the ‘treatment’, Table 
1 provides a test of the exogeneity of the lottery win by comparing lottery participants 
and nonparticipants in winning versus non-winning postcodes.
10  If winning postcodes 
are randomly selected, if the decision to respond to our survey is independent of whether 
the code was a winning one, and if households’ reporting of their own consumption 
behavior is not affected by living in a winning postcode, there should be no statistically 
significant differences between the two columns of Table 1. The table shows that 
participants in winning codes only differ from those in non-winning codes with regard to 
higher education level, age, and the amount spent on food away from home.
11  For 
nonparticipants, only the share of two-headed households is somewhat larger in winning 
codes. Overall, the message of Table 1 is one of consistency with random selection of 
winning codes and absence of response or recall bias.  To test this more formally, we 
estimated linear probability models of living in a winning code as a function of all the 
                                                 
9 The PCL administration did not provide the number of participants in non-winning codes, in which case 
we could simply have dropped the non-winning codes without participants. 
10 The statistics in Table 1 are also consistent with national means from Statistics Netherlands.  See this 
paper’s webpage for details.     
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variables in Table 1, separately for PCL participants and nonparticipants.
12  In neither 
case could we reject the hypothesis that all of the coefficients in the regression (excluding 
the constant term) were zero (p=0.2771 for participants, p=0.9012 for nonparticipants).  
  Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on awareness of and participation in the 
postcode lottery and on amounts won.  In both winning and non-winning postcodes, all 
participating households say they remember that a PCL Street Prize was awarded in that 
code six months after the fact. Awareness among nonparticipants is significantly higher 
in winning postcodes than in non-winning codes. Both for participants and 
nonparticipants, those living in the winning postcode do recall the number of households 
who won, and report house numbers of at least some of these winners significantly more 
often than their counterparts in the neighboring non-winning codes do (for example, for 
nonparticipants the numbers are 42 vs. 17 percent and 20 vs. 4 percent, respectively). 
Such high awareness levels would seem to be conducive to social effects.  
The next two sections of Table 2 provide information on PCL ticket ownership 
and winnings.  The average PCL participant held about 1.8 tickets; the average amount 
won was €18,596.  After the 25% lottery tax, these winnings correspond to about 
€13,947, or about 7 months of post-tax income for a typical Dutch household. 11.2 
percent of ticket owners in winning codes won a BMW.  Adding in the expected value of 
this BMW (we value the BMW at €25,000), the average amount won by a household in 
the PCL rises to €13,947 + .112(€25,000) = €16,047, or about 8 months of income for an 
average family in our sample.
13   
The remainder of Table 2 presents a variety of indicators of the amount of lottery 
winnings that took place in the geographical vicinity of a typical household in our data.  
According to our data, in winning codes, just under half of PCL nonparticipants lived 
next door to a PCL winner.
14  The average amount won by a PCL nonparticipant’s two 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 The recalled expenditure amounts tend to be higher for the winners than for the participants in non-
winning postcodes. Conceivably, the winnings induce respondents to recall higher amounts than they 
actually spent in the past. 
12 Education and age effects were interacted with whether the household was single-headed, to incorporate 
the fact that our indicators of these characteristics differ by household type.     
13 The BMW awarded in the PCL is a model 116i.  Between 2005 and 2007 we found advertised new prices 
for this vehicle ranging from €25,400 to €28,500.     
14 In principle, a household in (but at the boundary of) a non-winning code could live next door to a PCL 
winner; our method of identifying neighbors will not capture these households.  Households living in non-
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immediate neighbors (combined) was €12,552. Both of these numbers were somewhat 
higher among PCL participants; this may reflect social interactions in ticket holdings. For 
an average non-winning household living in a winning code, 2.4 winning households 
lived in the same building (and were thus assigned the same (x, y) location) and 2.9 
winning households lived within 25 meters. A typical non-winning household in a 
winning code shared that code with 7.8 winning households who won a total of €199,842 
between them.  
 
5. Effects of Lottery Prizes on Winners 
  Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for a list of outcome variables that are 
possibly affected either by winning the lottery, or by living close to lottery winners.  The 
difference between the entries in columns 3 and 1 provides the empirical analogue to the 
ATE described by equation (2).   
  For PCL participants in winning and non-winning codes we find statistically 
significant post-lottery differences in expenditures on food away from home, other 
monthly items, and total monthly expenditures.
15 We also find that participants in 
winning codes were 4.5 times as likely to initiate major exterior home renovations during 
this period and spent over €500 more on noncar durables than participants in non-
winning codes.
16 Note that these responses are consistent with liquidity-constrained 
versions of the life cycle consumption model (e.g. Browning and Crossley 2009, where 
households adjust the timing of durables purchases to smooth consumption), or with 
‘mental accounting’ models with self-imposed borrowing constraints (Shefrin and Thaler 
1988). In addition, Table 3 shows some significant differences in car ownership between 
winning and non-winning codes six months after the lottery date.  For example, the main 
car of participating households in winning codes is on average thirteen months newer 
                                                                                                                                                 
winning codes but close to winners are, however, included in our Euclidean-distance-based measures of 
proximity to winners.   
15 The effect for food away from home, however, seems to be driven by the fact that pre-lottery 
expenditures in that category were already higher among participants in winning codes; see Table 1.  These 
retrospective consumption measures may however be biased among lottery winners.     
16 The ‘occasional’ expenditure amounts (including vacations and non-car durables) in Table 3 are not 
directly comparable to the pre-lottery levels in Table 1 because the latter refer to the 18-month period 
preceding the lottery date in one’s codegroup.   
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than in non-winning households.
17 PCL winners are also somewhat more likely than non-
winners to donate the fee they receive for completing our survey to charity.  
Since BMWs are a prize in the PCL, it is of interest to look specifically at BMW 
ownership six months after the lottery. The results for BMW ownership are clear: six 
months after the lottery, participating households in winning codes are statistically no 
more likely to own a BMW than participating households in non-winning codes.  Thus it 
appears that most BMW winners either elected to receive the cash prize in lieu of the 
BMW or sold their BMWs shortly after they received them. To explore this result further, 
the bottom panel of Table 3 provides additional details on post-PCL BMW ownership. It 
shows that 25 BMW winners responded to our survey.  Of these, only four, or 16 percent, 
still owned a BMW at the survey date.
18  While this percentage of BMWs is more than 
one would expect in a random sample of Dutch households, overall the behavior of the 
BMW winners in our sample is remarkably consistent with simple models of in-kind 
transfers (see for example Moffitt 1984, 1989): whenever a gift in kind would induce a 
suboptimal consumption mix (as a new BMW is likely to do for the vast majority of 
Dutch households), that gift should, if possible, be converted into its cash equivalent, and 
either spent on other items or saved.  
 
6. Effects of Lottery Prizes on Neighbors of Winners 
The difference between the entries in columns 4 and 2 of Table 3 provides the 
empirical analogue to the ITE described by equation (4). We do not find significant 
differences in consumption for any of the monthly or non-car durable expenditures. 
Among nonparticipants, those who live in winning codes are less likely to play the PCL 
six months later. The regret aspect of the PCL combined with a “lightning never strikes 
(the same postcode) twice” misperception might provide an explanation: Having 
observed the “losers” in their neighboring winning postcode, nonparticipants in non-
                                                 
17 To avoid the possibility that this is simply the mechanical consequence of the fact that cars (specifically 
BMWs) were a prize in the PCL, all BMW winners have been excluded from this sample. 
18 Our survey collects information on a maximum of two cars per household.  Could a significant number 
of BMW winners still own a BMW as their third, or higher-order car?  For 18 of the 25 BMW winners, this 
is impossible, since they own either zero or one car at the survey date.  Of the remaining 7 households, two 
report owning a BMW at the survey date.  Thus at the very most, 5 BMWs could be missing from our 
sample for this reason.  Since owning more than two cars is very rare in the Netherlands, the true number is 
likely much smaller.  
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winning codes may feel a strong urge to “insure” against non-winning through 
participation. Witnessing one’s postcode-mates win the PCL does not make non-winning 
households any less happy six months after the fact. However, Table 3 also shows that 
nonparticipants in winning codes are significantly more likely (24 versus 17 percent) to 
buy a car in the six months after the lottery date, to own more cars at the survey date, and 
to own more total car efficiency units at the survey date.
19 
  Of all our consumption indicators, cars are (a) likely to be the most visible to 
one’s residential neighbors, and (b) durable. Unlike an expensive party or vacation, a 
household’s neighbors are continuously reminded of its new car after it has been 
purchased. This leads us to conduct a more detailed analysis of social effects of lottery 
winnings on car consumption, using simple comparisons that take the best possible 
advantage of the exogenous assignment of lottery winnings in our sample. Table 4 
presents simple means of our four car consumption indicators for three subgroups of 
nonparticipants: those who live in non-winning codes, those who live in winning codes 
but do not live next door to a PCL winner (these households will be affected by any 
postcode-wide social effects on car consumption), and those who do live next door to a 
PCL winner (who are affected both by postcode-wide social effects and those stemming 
from their immediate neighbors).  In addition to our car consumption measures, the 
second row of Table 4 asks – as a placebo test – whether a household acquired one of its 
currently-owned vehicles in the six months before (rather than after) the lottery.  Clearly, 
all indicators of car consumption in Table 4 except row two are largest (smallest for car 
age) for households living next door to PCL winners.  To the extent that, within 
postcodes, living next door to a PCL ticket holder is exogenous, Table 4 provides 
convincing evidence that (a) social effects of winning the PCL do exist, but (b) they are 
highly localized, restricted in large part to a household’s nearest neighbors.   
  Table 5 extends the analysis of Table 4 by addressing the possible endogeneity of 
living within one or two doors of a PCL winner.  If living next door to a PCL winner is 
endogenous (which in our framework would require unobserved household 
characteristics to be correlated within postcodes at the extremely detailed level of next-
                                                 
19 Our efficiency units measure combines information on both the number and quality of cars owned by the 
household at the survey date.  A car that is less than one year old is defined as one efficiency unit; all other 
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door neighbors), Table 4’s estimates could be biased.  To address this concern, Table 5 
uses information from our survey to construct an indicator of whether a household lives 
next door to a PCL participant.  As already noted, this indicator is necessarily incomplete 
because it is survey-derived.  In particular, to be in the sample for columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 5, a survey household must have had at least one of its two nearest neighbors 
respond to the PCL survey and at least one of those neighbors must report holding a PCL 
ticket in our survey.  That said, by construction, all the households in the Table 5 sample 
live next door to a known PCL ticket owner; the only variation in whether their neighbors 
have PCL winnings is generated by the random selection of winning codes.  As the Table 
makes clear, all indicators of current car consumption with the exception of the ‘placebo’ 
measure in row 2 are higher (lower for car age) for those households who were exposed 
to the treatment of having a next-door neighbor win the PCL. Sample sizes are small, 
however, and only one of the comparisons is statistically significant, at the 10% level. In 
columns 3 and 4 we replicate this analysis, expanding the sample to nonparticipating 
households who live within two doors of a known PCL participant.  Both sample size and 
statistical significance now increase. 
 
7.  Regression results 
  In this section we specify and estimate a simple regression model of consumption 
in the presence of lottery winnings.  These regressions control for codegroup fixed effects 
and for any differences in observed pre-lottery household characteristics (including 
income) that are present despite randomization, thereby increasing statistical precision.  
The regression approach also facilitates using alternative definitions of a household’s 
social comparison group (see Table 2) and information on the intensity of treatment 
(amount of winnings).  Our regression framework also generates estimates of the pure 
‘own’ effects of lottery winnings on consumption, and relates these estimates to the ITEs 
and ATEs estimated in the preceding sections.   
Specifically, we assume a household’s consumption is given by:  
(5)     i i N i i WIN WIN C         ) ( , 
                                                                                                                                                 
cars owned by the household are depreciated by 15% per year.     
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where WINi is the household’s own lottery winnings,  measures the amount won 
by its comparison group, N(i), and i represents other (observed and unobserved) 
determinants of consumption.
) (i N WIN
20  We define β in (5) as the own effect of lottery winnings, 
and γ as the social effect.  Both of these coefficients are related in a straightforward way 
to the ITE and ATE estimated in the previous section; specifically, the ITE is 
proportional to γ, while the ATE (the effect of winnings on winners) is a linear 
combination of γ and β (since winners are exposed to income shocks among their 
neighbors as well).
21  
Finally, the regression approach facilitates the testing of some simple hypotheses 
in the theory of consumption.  For example, according to the life cycle model, 
households’ consumption decisions should be more strongly linked to their own 
nonlottery income than to own lottery winnings, because the former contains a larger 
permanent component.  The life-cycle model also predicts larger consumption responses 
to own lottery winnings among older, and among poorer households because in both 
cases the income shock is a higher fraction of remaining lifetime income.  Models of 
conspicuous consumption predict that only visible goods should be subject to neighbors’ 
income shocks.  Finally, psychological models of adaptation predict that temporary 
income shocks will raise happiness more than permanent income shocks, while models 
where utility depends on relative income predict that positive shocks to neighbors’ 
                                                 
20 An alternative specification of (5) would have own consumption depend not on neighbors’ income but on 
neighbors’ consumption (i.e. that social effects are endogenous, not exogenous).  In this paper we focus on 
the latter, for three reasons.  Most obviously, shocks to neighbors’ incomes are randomly assigned in our 
context; changes in their consumption are not.  Second, households’ consumption is multidimensional, 
which makes it far from clear how to best model consumption interdependencies.  (Does my propensity to 
buy a car depend on your purchase of a specific model and quality of car, on your decision to purchase any 
car, on the fact that you recently made a visible purchase of any kind, or simply on the fact that you won 
some money?).  Third (and related), effects of neighbors’ consumption and income on a household’s own 
consumption are, in general, not separately identified by a neighbor’s-income instrument.  
21 Since (ignoring taxes) each winning ticket pays 12.5 (thousand) Euro, WINi = 12.5Ti Wi and WINN(i) = 
12.5TN(i) Wi , where Ti denotes the number of tickets held by the household. Substituting (5) into (2) and 
(4) reveals that, under Assumptions 1 and 2, the ATE and ITE can be expressed, respectively, as  ITE = 
) ( 5 . 12 i N T    and  ATE =    ) ( 5 . 12 5 . 12 i N i T T    ,where  i T  and  ) (i N T respectively are the mean number of 
own and neighbors’ tickets for a representative household in the sample.  Note also that (5) implicitly 
assumes that β and γ are the same for PCL participants and nonparticipants; this is the additional 
assumption that identifies β in this context.        
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incomes should reduce happiness.
22  
The regression approach also has some potential drawbacks. Note first that 
whereas Wi (living in a winning code) is randomly determined, individual ticket holdings 
and hence WINi may be correlated with unobserved household tastes or constraints that 
may affect its consumption of all items, including lottery purchases. For example, risk-
loving households may buy more PCL tickets, and may also have different consumption 
patterns for other items than risk-averse households.  Fortunately, we can account for this 
kind of bias by including controls for the number of tickets Ti held by the household at 
the time of the win. Specifically, we include in all of our regressions a quadratic in 
number of tickets purchased plus a fixed effect for participation in the PCL.
23   
Unfortunately, a similar strategy is not available for  , because we do not 
have data on lottery ticket ownership for households who did not respond to our survey.  
Thus, if (for example)  is the total amount won in the household’s postcode, 
will depend not only on whether the postcode was a winner, but on the number of 
households it contains and their propensity to own PCL tickets; these are nonrandom 
factors that might be correlated with a household’s consumption decisions.  We rely on 
codegroup fixed effects to control for such factors, but also remark that, as already noted, 
(a) our results are not sensitive to controls for postcode size, and (b) PCL ticket 
ownership in our sample is very similar between winning and nonwinning postcodes, 
especially within codegroups.  We also show below that our results are not sensitive to 
codegroup fixed effects, suggesting that spatial correlation of unobservables does not 
play a large role in the relationships we identify here.
) (i N WIN
) (i N WIN
) (i N WIN




                                                 
22 For recent reviews of both these literatures, see Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz and Stone 
(2006), and Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008).  
23 The results are very similar if we include a dummy for each integer number of tickets purchased.  
24 Another remedy for possible unobserved differences in neighbors’ ticket holdings is to time-difference 
our consumption measures within households; this is possible for some of our consumption indicators 
where we have (retrospective) information referring to the period before the lottery win.  While recall bias 
is a concern with these estimates, they are largely similar to our main results.  See the previous version of 
this paper (Kuhn et al, 2008).   
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Own Effects of Lottery Winnings 
Row 1 of Table 6 reports our estimates of β, based on equation (5). Coefficients in 
this row represent the effects of winning €10,000 on the outcome variable in question; 
each column of the table corresponds to a different regression (the full specification is 
described in Table 6).  According to Table 6, winning the PCL –now (in contrast to the 
ATE) controlling for being near other winners-- has few detectable direct effects on 
monthly and occasional expenditure categories, including food at home, transportation 
expenditures, other monthly expenditures, and total monthly expenditures. Own effects 
are, however, found for various aspects of car consumption.  For example, winning 
€10,000 appears to reduce the average age of a household’s main car by about 0.4 years 
six months after the lottery date, and to raise expenditures on non-car durables by €310.
25  
Winning the PCL has no effect on a household’s reported happiness six months after the 
event. Contrary to the simple results for winners in Table 3 (which reflect a combination 
of own and social effects), greater lottery winnings do not raise the likelihood that a 
household will donate its fee for completing our survey to charity.   
Compared to lottery winnings – which are temporary and unexpected – cross-
sectional income differences should have a substantially larger permanent component.  In 
consequence, the life-cycle model of consumption predicts that cross-sectional income 
differentials should be more strongly related to current expenditures than are lottery 
winnings, at least for non-durables.  While this is true for most of our point estimates, the 
only statistically significant differences between the effects of lottery and nonlottery 
income are for whether the household donated its survey fee to charity (at 10%) and for 
happiness (at 1%).  To explore some other predictions of the life-cycle model, we re-
estimated Table 6 separately for low- and high-education groups, and for households 
whose heads are above and below the median age of 50, to see if ‘own’ responses to 
lottery income were larger among the old and poor.  While interesting, the results may 
reveal more about the distinction between luxuries and necessities and age-related 
                                                 
25 Comparing these estimates to the ATEs in Table 3 suggests that own effects account for most, if not all, 
of those ATEs.  In particular, according to Table 6 the estimated pure own effects of winning €18,000 (the 
mean amount won by PCL participants) on car age, car efficiency units and non-car durables are -.723, .069 
and €558 respectively.  These compare to ATEs of -1.114, .078, and €533 respectively.  Thus, only a PCL 
winner’s car age (i.e. the size of its car quality  ‘upgrade’) appears to be affected by social effects acting on 
PCL winners.     
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variation in a household’s consumption priorities than the life cycle hypothesis per se:  
low-education households spend more of their lottery winnings on cars, and less on 
vacations than high-education households. Young households also spend more of their 
lottery winnings on cars than older households, but older households’ non-car durables 
consumption is much more responsive to lottery income than younger households’. 
The one outcome on which lottery and nonlottery income have the most 
dramatically different effects in Table 6 is happiness. Indeed, in contrast to our results for 
lottery winnings, and consistent with both Easterlin (1974) and Stevenson and Wolfers 
(2008), higher total income is very strongly associated with happiness in a cross-section 
of households.  One interpretation of these contrasting results is that the six-month lag 
between the PCL win and the survey date is too long:  lottery winnings could affect own 
happiness, but the effects are very transitory, as argued by both Easterlin and by 
Kahneman et al. (2006).  Alternatively, the results of Gardner and Oswald (2007) suggest 
that six months might be too short:  In their analysis of Britons who receive lottery wins 
between £1000 and £200,000 they find that in the year a prize is won, mental stress goes 
up, while in subsequent years lottery winners show less stress than non-winners.  Finally, 
it is possible that happiness is simply more linked to long-run personal income than short-
run fluctuations, both because permanent income differences enable the household to take 
more happiness-improving actions, and perhaps because long-term income differences 
are more likely to be seen as earned and thus “legitimate”.
26   
 
Social Effects of Lottery Winnings 
  We estimated the social effects of living near PCL winners using all the indicators 
of neighbors’ winnings summarized in Table 2, but report only the results using four 
representative indicators in rows 3-6 of Table 6.  As already noted, the estimate in row 3 
is taken from the same regression as the coefficients in rows 1 and  2, which uses 
residence in a winning postcode (Wi ) as our indicator of neighbors’ winnings ( ).  
Each of the remaining rows re-runs this regression, replacing Wi by a different alternative 
) (i N WIN
                                                 
26 Another interpretation of our own-happiness results is of course the possibility that the cross-sectional 
correlation between income and happiness is driven by reverse causation (happier people are more 
successful in the labor market). This interpretation would, however, be at odds with Stevenson and 
Wolfers’ (2008) claim that economic growth promotes happiness.     
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indicator of neighbors’ winnings. (The estimated coefficients on own winnings and own 
nonlottery income did not change much, and are not reported to save space.)   Of these, 
row 4 is representative of our results when defining neighbors using Euclidean distance  
measures:  none of these distance-based indicators of neighbors’ winnings had 
statistically significant effects on consumption. We conjecture that these measures do not 
discriminate sufficiently among the very large share (81 percent) of Dutch households 
who live in multi-unit dwellings. (Households are defined as living in a multi-unit 
dwelling if their address shares a (x,y)-location with at least one other address.)   
Excluding these distance-based measures, Table 6 provides some evidence that 
neighbors’ winnings affect current PCL participation and disposition of the survey fee.  
For the vast majority of consumption indicators, however, no effects are found. An 
outcome of particular interest is happiness. According to column 14 in Table 6, living in 
a winning postcode (not winning oneself) has no effect on household’s happiness; more 
precisely we say with 95% confidence that living in a winning postcode (but not winning 
oneself) reduces happiness by no more than .11 of a standard deviation, and that it raises 
happiness by no more than .07 of a standard deviation.  This result contrasts with 
Luttmer’s (2005).  However, his result refers to effects of neighbors’ earnings on 
happiness, which have a bigger permanent component than lottery winnings, and 
neighbors’ earnings are not randomly assigned in his analysis.  The absence of an effect 
of exogenous changes in neighbors’ incomes on own happiness in our data is also 
consistent with Stevenson and Wolfers’ (2008) claim that relative incomes do not have 
large effects on happiness.   
Finally, consistent with the ITE estimates from the previous section, Table 6 
suggests the presence of social effects for two aspects of consumption that are arguably 
most visible to one’s neighbors: exterior home renovations and cars. While the evidence 
for the former is confined to one regression specification, the evidence for cars is more 
robust.  Statistically significant effects are found for all four indicators of car 
consumption, and for three of our four measures of neighbors’ winnings.  These estimates 
of social effects on car consumption are substantial in size.  For example, having an 
immediate neighbor win the PCL raises the probability that a household will buy a car in 
the next six months by close to 7 percentage points and reduces the mean age of its main 
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car at the survey date by half a year (about a 7 percent decline).  For two car consumption 
indicators (total car efficiency units and the age of the main car), the estimated effects of 
an immediate neighbor winning the PCL are very similar in size to the estimated own 
effects of winning €10,000; for the incidence of car purchases in the past six months it is 
actually greater than the own effect.  Thus, relative to the fact that the one-time lottery 
win has only a modest effect on households’ own consumption choices (consistent with 
the life-cycle hypothesis), these effects are substantial in magnitude. 
  A final possible concern with the results in Table 6 is the possibility that our 
procedure for selecting ‘control’ postcodes for the winning codes may have induced some 
nonrandomness.  (In most cases we simply included all adjoining codes, but occasionally 
some discretion was involved: see footnote 8.)  Although the available evidence suggests 
that our randomization was successful, we also tested the robustness of our results to the 
selection of non-winning postcodes by removing the codegroup fixed effects from the 
regressions in Table 6.  In regressions without fixed effects, we are comparing the 
behavior of households in winning codes to households in all non-winning postcodes in 
our sample. The results (reported on the paper’s website) were virtually unchanged.  In 
sum, our regression estimates of social effects confirm the nonparametric results reported 
in sections 5 and 6. 
 
8. Conclusion 
We have used the natural experiment associated with the Dutch postcode lottery 
(PCL) to study the own and social effects of a temporary, unexpected income shock equal 
to about eight months of income on households’ consumption behavior and self-reported 
happiness.  The natural experiment provided by the PCL has a number of advantages, 
including exogeneity of the income shock to a household’s residential neighbors and the 
absence of direct causal effects of household mobility.  According to our estimates, the 
effects of a lottery prize on winners are confined largely to cars and other consumer 
durables.  This finding is consistent with a permanent income model in which households 
adjust the timing of their durables purchases to smooth consumption, or with mental 
accounting models in which households are reluctant to borrow from accounts viewed as 
assets.  In addition, as predicted by simple models of transfers in kind, the vast majority 
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of households who exogenously receive a large, in-kind transfer (a new BMW) converted 
that prize into other goods or savings, despite the transactions cost or tax penalty 
associated with doing so. 
We do find robust evidence for effects of lottery prizes on neighbors of winners, 
but only for one good --car consumption-- which is likely to be easily, and repeatedly, 
visible to a household’s neighbors.  Higher-income households in our data are 
significantly happier than other households, but lottery winnings do not make households 
happier, nor do they make neighboring households less happy.  The latter two results, 
based on genuinely exogenous shocks to own and neighbors’ incomes, would seem to 
present challenges for both relative income-based and  for ‘habituation’ models of 
happiness.         
  What models of consumer behavior might explain the social effects estimated in 
our data?  While it is tempting to interpret our estimates as reflective of a psychological 
need to “keep up with the van den Bergs”
27, we note that they could also be driven by 
other factors.  For example, social spillovers in car consumption could be driven by 
winning households selling their used car to neighbors; or by households passing money 
to immediate neighbors, who might be family members.
28  In this regard it is noteworthy 
that intrafamily income transfers were indeed the main channel responsible for the social 
effects detected by Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) in Mexican villages; while this 
seems less likely in Dutch postcodes we cannot rule it out.  Also, it is worth re-
emphasizing that our estimates do not distinguish ‘imitative’ consumption patterns, or 
what are sometimes more generally called endogenous social effects (I buy a car because 
you buy one) from exogenous social effects of neighbors’ incomes on a household’s 
consumption.  Still, we find convincing evidence that households’ consumption of 
visible, durable goods (and only such goods) is affected by genuinely exogenous shocks 
to their neighbors’ incomes.  
                                                 
27 Parallel to “Jones”, van den Berg is the fourth most common surname in the Netherlands, according to 
Wikipedia.  (De Jong is first).   
28 Another possibility, suggested by Grinblatt, Keloharju and Ikaheimo (2008), is information sharing about 
a specific car model.  We think this is unlikely in the current context because most of the cars  purchased 
by nonwinners after the lottery date are used vehicles (i.e. more than one year old).  Note also that our 
estimated social effects for cars cannot be attributed to BMW winners selling an unwanted BMW to 
neighbors, since (among other reasons) none of the cars owned by nonwinners who bought a car since the 
lottery date are new BMWs.  
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Finally, we note that, despite the lack of detectable own spending responses for 
most consumption items, our results contain some encouraging news for fiscal policies 
such as unexpected tax rebates designed to stimulate consumer spending in developed 
economies:  To the extent that such ‘stimulus’ policies aim specifically at durables (a 
well known recent example is the U.S.’s “cash for clunkers” subsidies for automobile 
purchases) our results suggest that they may have substantial own effects, as well as 
significant social multiplier effects (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 2003).  These 
social multipliers are distinct from, and would presumably operate in addition to, the 
usual Keynesian multipliers that have been studied in this context.   
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Pre-Lottery Characteristics 
 
 









Basic Demographics:      
     Number of persons in household
 1  2.74 2.12 2.73 2.18 
     Two-headed household?
 1  0.767 0.581** 0.780 0.637** 
     Secondary education?
2  0.940 0.907 0.942 0.918 
     Higher vocational training or university?
 2  0.326* 0.342 0.256* 0.333 
     Age
3  49.60** 50.01 52.49** 49.77 
     Number of children in household  0.664  0.461  0.668  0.507 
      
For single-headed households:      
     Head works?  0.514  0.418  0.510  0.468 
     Head’s hours
4  14.94 14.19 19.22 15.90 
      
For two-headed households:       
     Husband works?  0.723  0.639  0.655  0.632 
     Husbands’ hours
4  28.21 23.87 24.85 23.74 
     Wife works?  0.623  0.549  0.569  0.546 
     Wife’s hours
4  17.46 15.32 15.57 15.37 
      
Monthly expenditures: (euro, one year before survey date)      
     Food at home   426.28  438.58  460.24  412.80 
     Food away from home   83.85***  100.74  119.63***  83.42 
     Transportation   177.43  178.03  178.90  186.47 
     Other monthly  239.07  240.10  290.82  245.78 
     Total monthly   936.46  951.79  1057.51  897.60 
      
Occasional Expenditures:      
Exterior home renovations before lottery (any?)
 5  0.090 0.040 0.063 0.042 
Other home renovations before lottery (any?)
 5,6  0.183 0.167 0.148 0.149 
Vacation expenditures before lottery  (euro)
 5    307.48 349.24 486.12 457.05 
Non-car durables expenditures before  lottery  (euro)
 5  1737.37 1574.20 1971.67 1519.74 
      
Total Annual Household Income (euro, post tax, pre lottery)  25341  22679  27322  22490 
      
Happiness
7    6.87 6.68 6.92 6.78 
      
Sample size
8   301 878 223 477 
 
Notes:   Statistically significant differences between columns 1 and 3 and between columns 2 and 4 
denoted by ***, **,  and *  for p <  .01,  .05, and  .10 respectively 
 
1.  Refers to one year before the survey date.   
2.  For single-headed households, indicates whether the head has at least the level of education indicated.  
For two-headed households, indicates whether at least one head has this level of education.  
3.  For single-headed households, age in years.  For two-headed households, a simple average of the 
husband’s and wife’s ages.  
4.  Usual weekly hours one year before the survey date.  Equals zero for non-workers.  
5.  Refers to the 18 month period preceding the lottery date.  
6.  Includes interior renovations and those whose type could not be determined.   
7. Self assessed on a scale from 1 to 10 (refers to one year before the survey date) 
8.  Gives the number of observations in winning and non-winning codes.  Sample sizes vary across rows of 






Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics, Lottery Characteristics 
 
 









Awareness of lottery:   
Remember PCL Street Prize?  1.000  0.534***  1.000  0.816*** 
Recall number of winning households
  0.369*** 0.170*** 0.776*** 0.421*** 
Recall winners’ house numbers  0.086***  0.042***  0.363***  0.195*** 
      
Lottery participation and winnings:      
Number of tickets held  1.853  0  1.783  0 
Amount of cash won (euros)  0***  0  18596***  0 
Won BMW?  0***  0  0.112***  0 
      
Indicators of neighbors’ winnings:      
Had an immediate neighbor who won?  0***  0***  0.596***  0.488*** 
Number of immediate neighbors who won (0, 1, 2)  0***  0***  0.744***  0.583*** 
Total amount won by immediate neighbors (incl. BMW value)  0***  0***  15135***  12552*** 
      
Number of winning households:      
In same building  0.299***  0.473***  2.685***  2.362*** 
Within  25  meters  0.385*** 0.536*** 3.329*** 2.859*** 
Within  100  meters  4.336*** 3.991*** 7.982*** 6.581*** 
In your postcode  0***  0***  9.946***  7.815*** 
      
Total amount won:      
In same building  8056***  12414***  65315***  61789*** 
Within  25  meters  10257*** 13875*** 82095*** 74500*** 
Within  100  meters  107558*** 99513*** 203266***  165921*** 
In your postcode  0***  0***  255518***  199842*** 
 
 
Notes:   Statistically significant differences between columns 1 and 3 and between columns 2 and 4 






Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics, Outcome Variables 
 
 









      
Monthly expenditures: (euro, at the survey date)   
     Food at home   464.91  471.40  494.55  450.26 
     Food away from home   83.64***  97.87  124.50***  89.67 
     Transportation   189.89  192.34  213.87  211.81 
     Other monthly  254.50**  255.32  335.72**  279.53 
     Total monthly
1   995.12**  1002.48  1180.88**  1025.55 
      
Occasional expenditures:      
Exterior home renovations since lottery (any?)
   0.0100** 0.0171 0.0448** 0.0231 
Other home renovations since lottery (any?)
   0.0831 0.0718 0.0717 0.0650 
Vacation expenditures since lottery  (euro)
2  449.67 195.31 482.96 167.61 
Non-car durables expenditures since  lottery  (euro)
 2 658.90**  805.69  1191.80**  744.85 
      
Total annual household income (euro, post tax, pre lottery)  26662  23337  28444  24170 
      
Other outcomes:      
Happiness
3    7.02 6.82 7.06 6.87 
PCL participant at survey date?  0.924  0.131**  0.933  0.094** 
Donate survey fee to charity?  0.442*  0.418  0.525*  0.440 
      
Car variables (non-BMW winners only):      
Acquired car since lottery date?
 4  0.156 0.173** 0.170 0.236** 
Number of cars (up to 2)  1.203  0.929***  1.212  1.023*** 
Age of main car (years)  6.502***  7.139  5.388***  6.786 
Total car efficiency units
5  0.484** 0.350*** 0.562** 0.406*** 
      
BMWs six months after lottery (incl. BMW winners):      
share respondents owning BMW  .037  .015  .031  .008 
         among cash winners (198 obs.)      .015   
         among BMW winners (25 obs.)      .160   
 
 
Notes:   Statistically significant differences between columns 1 and 3 and between columns 2 and 4 
denoted by  ***, **,  and *  for p <  .01,  .05, and  .10 respectively.  See Table 1 for sample sizes. 
 
1. Sum of food at home, food away from home, transportation plus other expenditures.  
2. Refers to the 6 month period between the lottery and survey dates. 
3. Self assessed on a scale from 1 to 10 (refers to the survey date) 
4. Equals one if the household acquired any of the autos it currently owns after the lottery date. 








Table 4: Car Consumption Indicators for PCL Nonparticipants 
 




    More than 2 
doors from a 
PCL Winner 
Within 2 doors 
of a PCL Winner 
Next door to a 
PCL Winner 










Bought a car between 6 








































*, **, ***: statistically different from column 1 at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively 
†, ††, †††: statistically different from column 2 at at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively 
Sample sizes in parentheses.   
 
 
Table 5:  Car Consumption Indicators for PCL Nonparticipants who are Neighbors of 
Participants 
  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Next-door neighbors of PCL 
Participants 
Live within two doors of a PCL 
Participant 


















Bought a car between 6 







































*, **, ***:   Differs from non-winning codes at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  30 
 
Table 6:  Own and Social Effects of Lottery Winnings 
 
  OUTCOME: 
  CAR CONSUMPTION  MONTHLY EXPENDITURES  OCCASIONAL EXPENDITURES  OTHER 



















  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
 
 
Lottery   .0208 .0165  -.4019*  .0382*  13.43  17.65**  9.61  19.10  66.56 .0038 .0086 -3.87  310.23**  -.0226  .0067  -.0135 
Winnings  (.0197) (.0252)  (.2086) (.0210)  (16.03)  (7.93)  (11.81)  (18.49)  (41.30) (.0032) (.0091)  (62.43)  (131.27)  (.0500)  (.0083)  (.0141) 
                              
Nonlottery   -.0002 .0334***  -.1170 .0245*** 8.80  15.62**  -7.96 15.62* 43.43*  .0007  .0075*  91.56 200.51**  .1243***  .0086* .0140* 
    Income  (.0080)  (.0082) (.0801) (.0065) (11.29)  (6.06)  (11.99)  (9.28) (24.95)  (.0033) (.0041) (74.41) (79.35) (.0249) (.0046) (.0077) 
                              
Winning   .0460*  .0003 -.3857 .0197 -33.17  -10.33  24.71 2.28  -12.49  .0088 -.0198*  -54.06 -28.51 -.0323  -.0326**  .0711*** 
  Postcode?   (.0243)  (.0272)  (.2454)  (.0163)  (38.21) (12.91) (21.62) (25.77)  (71.81)  (.0076)  (.0120)  (94.82)  (176.44)  (.0793)  (.0138)  (.0235) 
 
ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF NEIGHBORS’ WINNINGS: 
# winners  .0041*  .0040*  -.0464**  .0043***  -1.26  -.98 .98 -.23 -1.36  .0014**  -.0008  9.36* -4.34 .0008  -.0022**  .0082*** 
   in postcode  (.0021) (.0024) (.0180)  (.0014)  (2.70) (1.03) (1.71) (3.63)  (6.54)  (.0006)  (.0011)  (5.44)  (18.90) (.0087) (.0011) (.0018) 
                              
Winnings in  .0018  -.0003  -.0244 .0001 -.98 .40 .29 -.83 -1.51 -.0006  .0006 6.06 16.39  -.0069  -.0021**  .0032 
   25 meters  (.0020) (.0024) (.0213)  (.0012)  (1.91) (.82) (1.72) (2.61)  (5.05)  (.0005)  (.0011)  (5.66)  (12.50) (.0077) (.0010) (.0025) 
                              
Neighbor   .0675** .0029 -.4996*  .0407* -43.49  -10.52  47.54 -1.20  8.96  -.0078  .0084  -32.77 -139.84 .1729  .0122 .0843*** 
  won?   (.0310)  (.0323)  (.2788)  (.0237)  (37.47) (11.77) (34.83) (40.01)  (97.34)  (.0113)  (.0172)  (98.41)  (245.05)  (.1057)  (.0193)  (.0302) 
 
 
Notes:  Rows 1-3 show coefficients on own winnings, own non-lottery income and a winning postcode dummy, all included in the same regression.  Rows 4-6 show the 
coefficients on alternative measures of neighbors’ winnings when they are substituted for the winning postcode dummy in the regression shown in rows 1-3 (coefficients on 
own winnings and nonlottery income do not change much when different indicators of neighbors’ winnings are used).  All specifications also include a fixed effect for 
lottery participation, a quadratic in the number of tickets purchased, and controls for the presence of a partner, number of children and its square, age and its square, 
education, and a full set of codegroup fixed effects. Standard errors clustered on postcodes.  Total winnings (after tax) are measured in euros/10000 and include BMW 
values.  “Got Car” means that one of the household’s currently-owned cars was acquired in the six months since the lottery date.  See previous tables for variable 
definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
F-Tests fail to reject equality of the Lottery Winnings and NonLottery Income coefficients for all consumption items but two:  Happiness (p=.0097) and Charity (p=.0910). 
   